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Abstract 
The pervasiveness of flash based USB storage alongside increasing capacity and lowering price points has lead 
to a documented potential for information leakage. Such a potential is significantly raised when employees are 
able to use personal devices within a business environment with little regard to safe disposal practices. This study 
purchased a range of USB storage devices from UK based auction sites to determine what if any data was 
recoverable. The study found a total of 36136 recoverable files including a range of data detailing private 
information of previous owners, confidential corporate data, with twenty percent of the purchased USB devices 
securely wiped before sale. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United Kingdom has a widely documented history of information leakage due to either the loss of or 
improper disposal of hardware (Kennedy, 2008; Oates, 2008; BBC, 2008; BBC, 2009). With the broad range of 
well publicised incidents alongside freely available secure erasure tools it may be expected that there should be a 
reduction in the phenomenon. Therefore the purpose of this research was to investigate a random sample of the 
second hand portable storage market and quantify whether the increased awareness has lead to any real 
improvement.  
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
One of the earlier and more influential studies into this area was conducted by Jones (2005) on the disposal of 
corporate hard disks. It was found that only 16% of the imaged disks were completely erased, with a further 48% 
showing signs of superficial data removal. Even with such attempts 51% of the imaged disks contained personal 
information, 20% financial information, 8% network information and 4% contained illicit material. 
This research was expanded in 2006 in a joint study (Jones, 2006). In this attempt 42% were found to be totally 
blank, 28% contained commercial data and a further 29% individual data. This was an improvement on the 
previous year but still an unacceptable level. The 2007 results were similarly decreased with a 37% finding of 
personal data. 
In the following year the InfoWatch (2008) research enumerated the victims of information leakage into 
commercial entities (50%), educational and non-governmental organizations (31%) and governmental bodies 
(18%). When further quantified, it was revealed that 95% of the leakage could be classified as personal data with 
portable storage accounting for most of these. The results were supported by Hoffman (2008)  who found that 
over 25% of employees admitted to storing sensitive data from there organization on portable storage devices. 
Despite such findings the BERR (2008) survey detailed that over 67% of the companies in their study did 
nothing to prevent confidential data being transported on unsecured USB sticks and other removable media. This 
was followed again in 2009 with a survey which found that 52% of the disks contain organizational information, 
51% personal information, and only 31% of the disks were wiped (Jones, 2009).  
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WHY TARGET USB STORAGE 
USB flash storage has gradually become synonymous with portable data storage since its commercial 
introduction in 2000 (ENISA, 2008). A study conducted by Gartner (2005) enumerated the market for USB flash 
drives in 2004 as $1.47 billion forecasts growth to reach $3.47 billion in 2010. This growth in sales has been 
alongside an increase in the average capacity of these devices.  According to Crisp (2009) the average capacity 
of drives sold in 2005 was only 462.3MB which has grown to around 4.8GB in 2009.  
The portability and low price point of these devices has not been accompanied by the use of appropriate 
encryption. A 2007 study found that of the USB drives sold to corporate entities, as little as 10% claimed to 
mandate the use of encryption to protect the data (Chapman, 2007). This is despite research which detailed that 
over 77% of  USB drives may be used by users at work and of these users only 21% demonstrated awareness of 
information leakage threats (ENISA, 2008).  This usage was further enumerated into the type of data stored on 
USB devices as detailed in the figure below 
 
Figure 1. Corporate Data on USB Keys (ENISA, 2008) 
These worrying trends are compounded by the research conducted by the Ponemon Institute (2009) into 
downsized employees. They found that over 59% of their sample reported keeping company data after leaving 
employment. The type of data kept included email lists (65%), non-financial business information (45%), and 
customer information including contact lists (39%). Of the respondents that admitted to removing data, 42% 
utilised USB flash drives in the transfer. Despite this the research showed that 89% of companies in the study 
failed to audit USB devices for data leakage even though a majority did not require the return of flash storage on 
cessation of employment. 
SAMPLE ACQUISITION AND METHOD 
For the purposes of this research it was decided to target USB storage devices that were as widely available as 
possible, thus the UK version of eBay website was used in the acquisition of the sample. Only USB flash drives 
that were clearly marked by the seller as used were purchased and efforts were undertaken to ensure that each 
purchase was from a different seller and that no identifying features were present on the device. A range of 
capacities were purchased and are enumerated in the table below: 
 
Size 128Mb 256Mb 512Mb 1Gb 2Gb 4Gb 
Number of 
devices 2 1 4 8 3 2 
Table 1. Capacity of USB Drives used in sample 
Upon receipt of the devices, each was handled in accordance with correct forensic procedures. Once imaged the 
analysis was conducted using the following software: 
 Encase 5 
 Forensic Tool Kit 1.81.3.  
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 Recuva 
 Zero Assumption Image Recovery 
Every image within the study was subjected to a full range of recovery procedures as afforded by the 
aforementioned software packages.  
RESULTS 
In all 36,136 files were recovered from the secondhand USB devices. As detailed in the figure below the 
majority of files were Microsoft Word Documents, followed by images, then emails/html files. 
 
 
Figure 2 Total Files Recovered  
Post recovery the files were investigated and classified according to type individual or corporate. Individual files 
where determined to be any file that could not be identified as belonging or related to a business. Files were then 
further separated into the likely sensitivity of the information between high and low sensitivity. This data is 
enumerated in the following table. The four USB key devices that were determined to be empty, contained no 
recoverable files or folders and were also free of data within their unallocated clusters.  
 
Category Number of Keys  Percentage 
Empty 4 20% 
Individual 
Low 
Sensitivity 
14 
11 
70% 
55% 
High 
Sensitivity 14 70% 
Corporate 
Low 
Sensitivity 
6 
2 
30% 
10% 
High 
Sensitivity 6 30% 
Table 2.  Breakdown of Information Types Discovered 
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Of the keys that were categorized as containing individual data over 92% contained enough information to 
identify the owner of the USB storage device prior to sale. The extent of this information is illustrated in the 
figure 3. It is noteworthy that the inclusion of mothers maiden name and the date of birth would be significant in 
the likelihood of identity theft should the information be gathered for nefarious purposes. In addition to the 
personal identification a range of the devices contained banking and/or login information of the previous owner 
as detailed in figure 4.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Type of Personal Identifier 
  
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of Devices Containing Bank or Login Details 
 
In addition to the above findings, 15% of the devices contained the CV of either the owner or a third party. When 
this statistic is expanded to include keys that contained personal details of any third party this number increased 
significantly to 60%. These details included full names, passport details and third party banking information.  Of 
the devices containing corporate data, there were found company logos, form letter templates, meeting notes, 
financial reports, list of board members along with their personal information, turnover analysis, sales forecasts, 
signature scans and companies’ bank details. Such information would allow direct targeting of these companies 
for a range of fraudulent activities.  
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With the cataloguing of this information it was possible to delineate the type of threats that might be carried out 
against either the owners or the included third parties. The identified data (detailed in the table below) would 
facilitate over 32 criminal acts including direct removal of funds from an identified individuals account. 
 
Threats Identity Theft Fraud 
Industrial 
Espionage Blackmail 
Hacking / 
Network 
Intrusion 
Robbery 
Number of 
devices 11 9 2 5 4 1 
Table 3. Direct Threats Possible from Included Data 
CONCLUSION 
When the findings of this research is viewed in the light of the previously discussed studies a worry trend 
emerges. Whilst the breadth of collection is indicative of this work as a pilot study, the low rate (20%) of 
securely wiped devices is lower than that found in the HDD based research. This may be attributable to the fact 
that the previous studies were from corporate environments, whereas it is more likely that the sellers and 
previous owners of these devices were individuals. The range and seriousness of the information leakage 
represented by the data found on the devices was directly inline with other studies discussed.   
Without exception every study of this type has documented findings of threats to both corporates and individuals 
and this work is no exception. Of concern is that whilst the previous studies have typically dealt with corporate 
disposals, in this study the sellers are exclusively private individuals. Thus whilst the corporate problem may be 
reduced by awareness of liability and institutional education, it may be that the only viable solution to this sort of 
leakage by individuals may be the banning of sales of second-hand storage devices. The scope of this problem is 
barely known and definitely in need of further exploration. To this end similar studies are to be undertaken 
worldwide to gain a true understanding of the true impact of second-hand USB storage disposal.   
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